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LIST OF PARTIES BEFORE THIS COURT 
The list of the parties before this Court are reflected in the caption of the case. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
V« 
LUIS PEREZ-LLAMAS, ] 
Defendant/Appellant. ) 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
l Dist. Ct. No. 031600159 
I Ct. App. No. 20041084-CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
This Court obtains statutory jurisdiction over this felony conviction pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. §78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Issues 
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the district court correctly denied 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a warrantless search of his van 
by Utah State Trooper, Sergeant Paul Mangelson ("Sergeant Mangelson"). 
The subsidiary issues are: 
(1) Did Sergeant Mangelson have sufficient, reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
stop Defendant's van when the so-called purpose for the seizure was to remind defendant to 
get out of the passing/fast lane? 
(2) Was the scope of the stop exceeded when Sergeant Mangelson continued to 
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detain defendant by asking questions unrelated to the official purpose of the stop?" 
(3) Even if he consented to the search, was the scope of defendant's consent to 
have Sergeant Mangelson "look at the tires" impermissibly extended when the trooper broke 
the plane of the van's door, and thereafter touched, kicked, prodded, moved and otherwise 
probed the tires? 
(4) Did defendant revoke any apparent consent such that the second roadside 
search of the van by Sergeant Mangelson was unconstitutionally effectuated at the moment 
defendant closed the van's door, signifying his desire to not have the trooper conduct a 
further search? 
(5) Were there exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search of 
defendant's van where Sergeant Mangelson had numerous opportunities to obtain a warrant, 
but chose to ignore the warrant requirement because he believed that he was grounded in 
probable cause to search? 
B. Preservation of Issue and Propriety of Review 
The issues raised here were properly preserved below. See R. 17-24; 117, 202, at p. 
8. 
C. Standard of Appellate Review 
1. This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the denial of a motion to 
suppress under the clearly erroneous standard. The district court's conclusions of law are, 
however, reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the district court. See State v. Brake, 
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2004 UT 95, Tf5,103 P.3d 699 (noting that warrantless vehicle search is now reviewed non-
deferentially by Utah courts for correction of error); State v. Floor, 2005 UT App. 320, ^ f 1-
2, 119 P.3d 305; see also State v. Krulowski, 2004 UT 94, 100 P.3d 1222. Ultimately, 
whether a district court's ruling is constitutionally sound is a question of law reviewed de 
novo. See State v. Mohi, 901 P.2d 991, 1009 (Utah 1995). 
2. The State bears the burden of establishing reasonable suspicion/probable cause 
for a search and the existence of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless search. See 
State v. Larocco, 194 P.2d 460, 467-68 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Anderson, 
910 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1996); State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ffl[5-6, 63 P.3d 650. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are relevant to resolving 
this case, the relevant portions of which are reproduced verbatim in Addendum D: 
United States Constitution, Amendment IV; 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV; 
Utah Constitution, Article 1, Section 14; 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature Of The Case 
On October 14, 2003, Sergeant Mangelson pulled over a van for an alleged left lane 
violation on 1-5 in or about Nephi, Utah. Defendant was a passenger in the van being driven 
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by Mr. Reuben Zepeda. See R.l-3, 112, at p.3. After his motion to suppress the evidence 
seized from the van was denied by the district court, defendant entered a conditional guilty 
plea to possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5 8-37-
8, a second degree felony. R. 117, at p. 8. 
B. Course Of Proceeding and Disposition 
On January 2, 2004, Defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from 
his vehicle. R. 17-24. The district court denied the motion. R. 59-73. Defendant sought to 
file with the Supreme Court an interlocutory appeal, which was denied. R. 109. Defendant 
then entered a Sery plea1 to the second degree felony drug charge on October 6, 2004, but 
preserved his right to challenge the underlying search and seizure of his vehicle. R. 202, at 
p.8. On December 9, 2004, Defendant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for one to 
fifteen years on the basis of the guilty plea. He was, however, placed on probation in lieu of 
prison, and ordered to serve one year in the county jail. R.147, 203. 
Thereafter, Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal with the district court and an 
application for issuance of a certificate of probable cause with this Court, which was denied. 
R. 141. Subsequently, substituted counsel filed a motion with this Court under Rule 23B for 
a remand on innefectiveness of trial counsel, which this Court also denied. See Addendum 
C. 
1
 See State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct App. 1988). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant is a native and citizen of Mexico, who had been a lawful permanent 
resident alien in the United States since December 15, 1995. He is married and has two 
children who were born in the United States. See R.138. On October 14, 2003, Sergeant 
Mangelson stopped a van for an alleged left lane violation on 1-5 in or about Nephi, Utah. 
Defendant was a passenger in the van driven by Mr. Zepeda, who later testified that he first 
saw Sergeant Mangelson's cruiser when it pulled up behind him. R.201, at 53. Once Mr. 
Zepeda noticed the cruiser behind him, he moved over to allow Sergeant Mangelson to pass. 
After he moved to the right lane, Sergeant Mangelson pulled up beside him, in traffic, and 
peered from inside his cruiser into the driver's side window. R.201, at 55-56. Whether he 
saw the occupants as Hispanics in a mostly-Caucasian community, or for some other reason 
known only to him, Sergeant Mangelson backed off and then pulled in behind Mr. Zepeda. 
He promptly initiated pulling over the van by turning on his overhead lights. Mr. Zepeda 
testified that cars did not pass him that day. Rather, he was the one passing other cars. He 
further testified that it would not have been possible, as Sergeant Mangelson testified, for a 
car to pass him on the right without his noticing it. R.201, at 10-12, 55-56, 63. 
Sergeant Mangelson admitted that he has, on occasions, engaged in erratic driving 
patterns and has actually, while still behind the wheel, peered into the driver's side window 
in search of evidence. Even so, Sergeant Mangelson denied doing that here, and further 
denied that his purpose in looking into the window was to determine the ethnicity of the 
occupants. He testified under oath that he does not have the inclination to pull over Hispanic 
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individuals just because they are Hispanic." R.201, at 33-34. However, Sergeant 
Mangelson's testimony was either perjured, or his memory was severely lacking as he did, 
in fact, testify in 1992 that "as a result of [his] training at a seminar, [Trooper Mangelson] 
admitted that whenever he observed an Hispanic individual driving a vehicle he wanted to 
stop the vehicle." State v. Lopez, 831 P.2d 1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). When asked in this 
case, Sergeant Mangelson even denied that he had ever received that sort of training. R.201, 
at 34. 
At preliminary hearing, Sergeant Mangelson testified that he observed three cars pass 
Mr. Zepeda's van on the right. He said he was stationary in the median, and that he saw 
perhaps several cars pass the van on the right. When he caught up with Mr. Zepeda, he 
signaled for the van to pull over. R.200, at 7-8. Sergeant Mangelson's testimony at the 
suppression hearing was essentially the same, except that he testified he was able to view the 
cars passing Mr. Zepeda from his vantage point of being stopped in the median. R.201, at 
11-12, 27-28,48. In addition, Sergeant Mangelson testified at preliminary hearing that he 
could only see about a quarter mile from his vantage point, but at the suppression hearing he 
testified he could see more than a mile from where he was parked. Compare R.200, at 23, 
with R.201, at 28. Finally, Sergeant Mangelson testified that Mr. Zepeda was in the left lane 
when he signaled for him to pull over. R.201, at 30-31. He also testified that the video 
camera in his cruiser usually activates within a couple of seconds of when his over head 
lights are turned on. R.200, at 27. The video recording in this case begins with an image of 
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Mr. Zepeda's car in the right lane, contrary to Mangelson's assertion that he was in the left 
lane. R.201, at 31-33; R.204, Video at 3796. 
After stopping the van, Sergeant Mangelson approached and began asking questions. 
Because defendant and Mr. Zepeda essentially spoke only Spanish, Sergeant Mangelson 
testified that he had "[m]aybe a little bit [of a language barrier]," but that there was no real 
or practical barrier. R.201, at 16-17,35-36. While conversing with the occupants, Sergeant 
Mangelson testified that he noticed some tires in the van. He said the tires, in his opinion, 
looked like they contained contraband and were "laying there on the seats." R.201, at 37. 
At preliminary hearing, however, Sergeant Mangelson testified that the tires were "in the 
middle seat area of the van." R.200, at 9; R.201, at 14-15. The video tape clearly shows that, 
in fact, the tires were in the rear storage area of the van, far away from the two locations 
Sergeant Mangelson had identified as their location, and were sufficiently concealed from 
him to have any reliable probable cause as to their contents. R.204, Video at 3847. 
Sergeant Mangelson next asked to see the tires in the back of the van. In response to 
his request, the defendant-passenger got out of the van and opened the back door. R.201, at 
37. Defendant testified that he did not feel he could refuse Sergeant Mangelson's request 
because he was an officer of the law. He further testified that, because Sergeant Mangelson 
was obviously through searching the van, he tried to close the doors after the trooper 
returned to his cruiser. R.201, at 18-24. However, he testified that Sergeant Mangelson 
ordered him to leave the doors open. R.201, at 37. Ultimately, Sergeant Mangelson found 
- 7 -
approximately forty pounds of marijuana inside the tires. R.201, at 27. 
Defendant sought to suppress evidence of the search, but the district court denied the 
motion. R.69-73. The court found and concluded that Sergeant Mangelson had a reasonable 
suspicion to believe a violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-55 occurred and, therefore, the 
initial stop of the van was justified at its inception. The court also found that trooper 
Mangelson developed probable cause while obtaining information related to the initial 
purpose of the stop to infer that the occupants of the van were smuggling illegal narcotics. 
The court further found that based on the probable cause Sergeant Mangelson developed, the 
scope of the stop expanded from a simple traffic stop to a one involving narcotics trafficking, 
and that defendant voluntarily consented to searching the van. The district court further 
concluded that the stop and eventual search of the minivan in this case were reasonable 
according to both the United States and the Utah Constitutional requirements. See R. 69-73, 
Addendum B; R. 60-66, R. 81-88, Addendum A. 
Defendant subsequently entered a Sery plea to the second degree felony charge, but 
preserved the right to challenge in this Court the underlying search and seizure of his vehicle. 
R.202, at p.8. However, shortly before his release date from the county jail in 2005, the 
Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") lodged a detainer against Defendant advising 
him that he was going to be deported from the United States. As a result of the guilty plea 
to the drug charge, an immigration judge in El Paso, Texas, ordered Defendant deported to 
Mexico in July 2005, and stripped him of his lawful permanent resident alien status. 
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Through new counsel, defendant thereafter filed in this Court a Rule 23B motion to remand, 
sounding in ineffectiveness of counsel, and claiming that he has been separated from his 
family, and that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been told he would certainly be 
deported if convicted of an "aggravated felony offense" under federal immigration laws. 
On November 3, 2005, this Court denied the Rule 23B motion. See Addendum C. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Sergeant Mangelson lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to pull the van over 
because the driver did not in fact violate any articulable Utah law at the time of the stop. The 
videotape clearly shows that Sergeant Mangelson said he stopped the van for speeding, 
whereas he testified that the vehicle was pulled over for a lane-change violation. Because 
Sergeant Mangelson's testimony is contradictory and incredible, the district court's factual 
findings and conclusions of law premised on the contradictory testimony are erroneous and 
should be reversed. 
The scope of the stop was unlawfully extended when Sergeant Mangelson withheld the 
identity cards of the occupants of the van, failed to issue a citation, and otherwise delayed them 
long enough as to ask questions unrelated to the traffic stop. Because defendant was not free to 
leave, Sergeant Mangelson impermissibly and unlawfully exploited the primary reason for the stop; 
thus, any consent obtained from defendant was therefore involuntary. Further, even if defendant 
consented to the search, the consent was limited in scope and permitted Sergeant Mangelson to 
"look at the tires;" it was not given to allow him to rummage through the van and its contents. 
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Therefore the scope of consent was impermissibly extended, particularly at the point when 
defendant closed the van door to indicate permission to look further was thereby revoked. Besides, 
when considered under the totality of circumstances, the consent obtained as a result of exploitation 
of an illegal stop was involuntary as a matter of law 
Finally, the district court erred in failing to determine whether exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless search of the vehicle, for Utah law allows for a warrantless vehicle search 
only upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. However, rather than remand to the district 
court for additional findings, the evidence clearly shows the State cannot meet its burden of 
demonstrating any exigencies, as Sergeant Mangelson testified that he failed to garner a search 
warrant only because he believed he had probable cause to search, not because he was prevented 
from doing so because of any extra-ordinary circumstances. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS BY FINDING AND CONCLUDING THAT THE 
SEIZURE OF DEFENDANT'S VAN BY SERGEANT MANGELSON WAS 
JUSTIFIED AT ITS INCEPTION, THAT THE SCOPE OF THE SEIZURE 
WAS JUSTIFIABLY EXTENDED BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE UPON 
SERGEANT MANGELSON OBSERVING THE SHRINK-WRAPPED 
TIRES, AND THAT DEFENDANT FREELY CONSENTED TO THE 
SEARCH OF THE VAN, WHERE THE EVIDENCE INDICATE, AT THE 
VERY LEAST, THAT DEFENDANT'S CONSENT WAS OBTAINED 
THROUGH EXPLOITATION OF POLICE ILLEGALITY, AND THERE 
WERE NO EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING SERGEANT 
MANGELSON FROM OBTAINING A WARRANT. 
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A. The District Court clearly erred in finding that the stop of Defendant's van by 
Sergeant Mangelson was based on reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity 
where the trooper's articulated basis for the stop were clearly contradictory and the trooper's 
testimony was incredible. 
L The Warrantless Search Was not Made Pursuant to Exigent Circumstances 
Under Utah law, a warrantless vehicle search, as here, "requires both probable cause and 
exigent circumstances unless it satisfies the traditionally recognized justification for protecting 
the safety of the police or the public or preventing the destruction of evidence." Brake, 2004 
UT 95, Tf9, 103 P.3d at 699 (emphasis supplied). As demonstrated below, the warrantless 
vehicle search here lacks not only probably cause, but is definitely devoid of any exigent 
circumstances precluding Sergeant Mangelson from honoring the warrant requirement. As 
such, the district court decision lacking any analysis of exigent circumstance should be reversed 
by this Court.2 
2. The Stop of the Van Lacks Articulable Suspicion 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 29 L.Ed.2d. 889 (1968), as interpreted by Utah 
courts, stands for the proposition that a stop of a vehicle constitutes a "seizure" under the 
Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution and is thus justified only 
when "a police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person is engaging in criminal 
behavior.... The police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts, which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." 
2
 Defendant is cognizant that this Court may affirm the district court on any proper 
ground. See Debry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995). 
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Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P. 2d 231, 234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grds.f 
State v. Saddler, 2004 UT 105,^2, 104 P.3d 1265; see also State v. Cushing, 2004 UT App. 73, 
T[5,88P.3d368. Utah courts consider two factors in determining the reasonableness of a stop, 
namely, (1) whether the stop was justified at its inception, and (2) whether the detention was 
reasonable in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop at inception. See State v. Lopez, 
873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994); Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 129, 63 P.3d 650. 
The question before the district court, then, was what specific, articulable suspicion did 
Sergeant Mangelson have that defendant was engaging in criminal behavior? In sum, viewed in 
the light most favorable to the district court's decision, the State articulated, and the court 
found, the following: 
1. On October 14, 2003, Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway patrol stopped a van for 
and alleged left lane violation. Sergeant Mangelson testified at the preliminary hearing 
that he observed three cars pass the van on the right. Tr. P. 8, L. 6. 
2. Sergeant Mangelson initiated pursuit and signaled the van to pull over. Upon stopping, 
Mangelson approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Sergeant Mangelson testified, 
"As I got to the side of the vehicle I noted a couple of tires that were lying in the back of 
the van." Suppression Hearing (hereinafter "SH"), p. 13. Sergeant Mangelson also 
noticed that the tires were too big for the van and obviously did not belong to the van. 
SH, p. 19-20. Additionally, the officer testified that the tires were wrapped in 
shrinkwrap, SH, 9. 14. 
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3. Sergeant Mangelson asked for a driver's license and registration. The driver produced a 
high school identification and said that he only has a permit to drive, not a license. The 
passenger, Luis Perez-Llamas was riding in the passenger seat. 
4. After examining the diriver's I.D., but before returning it, Mangelson began questioning 
the occupants of the van regarding some packaging that he saw in the back of the van. 
Defendant speaks very little English, and most of the responses were either by the driver, 
or through him acting as an interpreter. The driver responded that there were some tires 
in the back of the van. Mangelson asked if he could look at the tires. In response to his 
request Defendant got out of the car and opened the back door of the van. 
5. Mangelson proceeded to examine the tires and continued his questioning of the 
occupants. After Mangelson looked at the tires, he returned to his cruiser. Defendant 
then closed the back doors of the van. Mangelson then told the Defendant to keep the 
doors open. Defendant then opened the doors. Mangelson returned with a stethoscope. 
He ordered Defendant and the driver to the shoulder of the road while the performed an 
echo test of the tire. 
6. After that, Mangelson ordered the driver to get into his cruiser and told Defendant to get 
in the van and follow him to the police station. About 15 minutes later they arrived at 
the station. Other officers were called on the scene and began searching the van. There 
was some discussion regarding the tires. The air pressure of the tires was taken. 
Eventually it was decided to arrest the driver and the defendant. After they were 
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arrested, Mangelson took the tires down to a local tire shop to have them "broken down." 
Upon removing the tires from the rims, contraband was uncovered. No warrant was 
sought to search the van or the tires. 
R. 60-66, R. 81-88; see also R.69-73. 
The district court concluded from the foregoing that Sergeant Mangelson had a 
reasonable suspicion to believe a violation of § 41-6-55 occurred and, therefore, the initial stop 
of the van was justified at inception. R.69-73. The court also concluded that Sergeant 
Mangelson developed probable cause while obtaining information related to the initial purpose 
of the stop to infer that the occupants of the van were smuggling illegal narcotics. The court 
further concluded that, based on the probable cause Sergeant Mangelson developed, the scope 
of the stop expanded from a simple traffic stop to one involving narcotics trafficking, and that 
defendant voluntarily consented to searching the van. Finally, the district court concluded that 
the stop and eventual search of the minivan in this case were reasonable according to both the 
United States and the Utah Constitutional requirements. See R. 69-73, R. 60-66, R. 81-88. 
3. The District Court's Findings and Conclusions are Erroneous 
The district court's factual findings are clearly erroneous. First, the articulated suspicion 
in this case was a left lane violation, in that the van "needed to pull over to the right or get out 
of the fast lane." R.200, at Tr. 8, L. 11-12; R.201, at 48. Defendant concedes that if cars were 
in fact passing the van on the right, Sergeant Mangelson would have been justified in 
effectuating the stop. However, Sergeant Mangelson was rather under-handed in his testimony 
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and his credibility on this point is lacking. Specifically, at the traffic stop, he mis-stated the 
reason for the stop. Sergeant Mangelson, as explicitly shown on the video tape, said '"you're 
going too fast" during the traffic stop. [R.204, at Video 4048]. This statement clearly and 
directly contradicts his later-stated reason for the stop, which was to implore the driver to 
change lanes. Also, as shown from the video, Sergeant forgot that he was retaining defendant's 
identification, and thus prolonging the stop while he questioned defendant [R.204, at Video 
4002-4048]. However, "going too fast" supports the driver's, Mr. Zepeda's, testimony that he 
was not being passed, but was rather doing the passing. See R.201, at 54-56. 
Even though Sergeant Mangelson has many years of experience making traffic stops, the 
fact that he was himself confused about the reason for the stop, as shown by the video, 
demonstrates there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop in the instant case. 
This case is, therefore, more analogous to those cases in which this Court has found that the 
police merely concocted the traffic violation to justify a search. For example, in State v. Bello, 
871 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App.), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994), the officer said he 
pulled the defendant over ostensibly for weaving in lanes. This Court held that one single 
incident of weaving was insufficient to justify stopping a vehicle and then obtaining consent to 
search. See id.; see also Hansen, 2002 UT 125, 63 P.3d 650 (finding vehicle search unlawful 
where officer obtained consent as a pretext). 
Accordingly, Sergeant Mangelson' spost-facto rationale for stopping the vehicle - to 
remind the driver to change lanes - is simply a concoction, but one which nonetheless 
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constitutes an insufficient reason to seize and detain a motorist. See Bello, 871 P.2d at 584. 
Therefore, the district court's factual findings and conclusions of law on the articulable 
suspicion justifying the seizure of the van should be reversed by this Court. Further, because a 
warrantless vehicle search requires articulable suspicion/?/^ exigent circumstances, see Brake, 
2004 UT 95, ^ [9, the district court's failure to analyze defendant's assertion on lack of exigent 
circumstances to justify the warrantless search also renders the district court's conclusions 
fatally-flawed and deserving of reversal by this Court. 
B. The District Court erred in finding that the scope of the stop was not 
unconstitutionally extended when Sergeant Mangelson asked questions unrelated to the 
stated purpose of the stop. 
1. Scope of the Stop 
It is axiomatic that where an officer stops a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, that 
officer may only obtain the vehicles's occupants so long as necessary to conclude the purpose 
of the stop: 
[D]uring a traffic stop an officer may request a driver's license and vehicle 
registration, conduct a computer check and issue a citation...Once the purpose of 
the initial stop is concluded, however, the person must be allowed to depart. Any 
further temporary detention for investigative questioning after [fulfilling] the 
purpose for the initial traffic stop constitutes an illegal seizure, unless an officer 
has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality. Hansen, 2002 
UT 125 at ^ 31, 65 P.3d 650 (alteration in original) (quotations and citations 
omitted). 
State v. Bissegger, 2003 UT App. 256,1fl[ 17-18, 76 P.3d 178, overruled on other grds.y State v. 
Rhyhart, 2005 UT 84, %3, _ P.3d _ , 2005 WL 3110681 (Nov. 22, 2005); see also State v. 
Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 437 (Utah App. 1990). 
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The stated purpose of the stop here was "to remind [the driver] that he needed to pull 
over to the right or get out of that fast lane." R.200, at Tr. 8. L. 11-12. Upon stopping the van, 
Sergeant Mangelson asked for "a driver's license and registration." Id., Tr. 8, L. 18. The driver 
did not have a license, but produced a high school activity card and stated that he had only a 
driver's permit. Id. at 22. What happened from that point on was nothing less than a fishing 
expedition. Sergeant Mangelson, for example, did not conduct a computer check and issue a 
citation or warning. Rather, he abandoned his stated reason for the stop and began asking 
questions relating to the tires in the back of the van, without attending to, let alone completing, 
his stated purpose for the stop. Sergeant Mangelson only returned to the reason for the stop at 
conclusion of the events at the side of the road. [R.204, Video at 3796-4070]. 
Trooper Mangelson's next question was to ask "where they were going." R.200, at Tr. 9, 
L. 2. He then inquired as to why there were two tires in their van. R.200, at Tr. 11, L. 12-13. 
He then asked "what's this back here....How 'bout lookin' at it? Do you mind if I look at it?" 
[R.204, Video at 3857; R.200, at Tr. 12, L. 5].3 It is important to note that during this entire 
inquiry, Sergeant Mangelson maintained custody of the driver's identity card. When asked if 
the suspects were free to go, Sergeant Mangelson said "no, I'd have to say no." R.200, at Tr. 6, 
L. 21. That admission by Sergeant Mangelson alone clearly shows that this was not a 
3
 Defendant concedes that a warrantless vehicle search is appropriate if the suspect 
consents freely and voluntarily. See Scneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 
2041(1973); State v. Stephens, 946 P.2d 734 (Utah App. 1997). However, it is defendant's 
position that he did not voluntarily consent to the search, given Sergeant Mangelson's 
unlawful extension of the scope of the stop, nor was there probable cause to support the 
search. 
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consensual encounter. See Hansen, 2002 UT 125,119 ("an encounter initiated by a traffic stop 
may not be deemed consensual unless the driver's documents have been returned to him."); 
accord, United States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996).4 
Therefore, all questions Sergeant Mangelson asked the suspects, except the first two 
relating to driver's license and registration, were questions that improperly expanded the scope 
of the stop to a level three encounter. However, reasonable suspicion of a specific criminal 
activity was required to further detain the van and its occupants. "The police officer must be 
able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion." Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234 (emphasis added). The 
district court found that the fact that the driver had no license, coupled with the shrink-wrapped 
tires, lead to a rational inference of drug activity. See R. 69-73; R.60-66. 
However, the district failed to consider that Sergeant Mangelson clearly exceeded the 
scope of the stop. Further, any notion of continuing consent is rendered invalid at the very 
moment a seizure becomes illegal - here, when Sergeant Mangelson illegally extended the 
scope of the traffic stop, thus rendering any arguably consent given invalid. In United States v. 
4
 Defendant anticipates that the State may contend that the doctrine of "de-escalation" 
applies here. De-escalation refers to a situation where a level two encounter - the so-called 
investigatory detention or traffic stop - turns into a level one encounter, where the suspect 
is free to ignore the officer and walk away. See State v. Dietman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987); Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^11, 63 P.3d at 650. De-escalation usually and truly occurs 
where, for example, the officer has returned the suspect's license and has issued a warning 
or citation for the stop. See id. Here, as in Hansen, Sergeant Mangelson had neither return 
the suspects' identification nor issue a citation when he began asking questions unrelated to 
the stop. See R.66. Accordingly, the encounter between defendant and Sergeant Mangelson 
remained, at the very least, at level two and had not de-escalated into a consensual encounter. 
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Ibarra, 955 F. 2d 1405 (10th Cir. 1992), after defendant's vehicle was illegally seized, it was 
brought to a lot and inventory searched. The Tenth Circuit ruled that any initial consent could 
not carry over into a second, illegal search: 
The government asserts that defendant's consent to search his vehicle 
carried over to the second search of his car conducted at the lot to which the 
vehicle was towed. We hold that because an illegal seizure occurred following 
the initial consent, that consent does not "continue" to justify the second search. 
Id. at 1411; see also Bello, 871P.2d at 584; Hansen, 2002 UT 125, ^ [11, 63 P.3d at 650. 
In this case, the search and seizure became illegal at two points: first, when Sergeant 
Mangelson illegally extended the scope of the stop; and second, when he ordered defendant to 
open the van door after the latter had closed it. Any consent arguably given ceased after each of 
those points, or had become "tainted," as it became clear that the trooper exploited the prior, 
illegal stop to obtain the consent. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599, 95 S.Ct. 2284 
(1975); Hansen, supra; Bello, supra. 
The State contended below that Sergeant Mangelson's numerous years of experience 
aroused his suspicions about the shrink-wrapped tires. However, this case calls into serious 
doubts exactly how Sergeant Mangelson's suspicions were aroused. For example, a cursory 
examination of some of appellate cases involving Sergeant Mangelson shows that where his 
suspicions really are aroused, he cuts, pulls, un-screws, separates and otherwise gets to the 
actual contraband at the roadside through whatever separates him from the contraband and 
seizes it at the roadside. See, e.g., State v. Marquet, 914 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1996); State v. 
Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220 (Utah App. 1995); State v. A House & 1.37 Acres of Real Property, 
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886 P.2d 534 (Utah 1994); United States v. Wald, 216 F.3d 1222 (10th Cir. 2000); United States 
v. Fernandez, 18 F. 3d 874 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.d 1294 (10th Cir. 
1994). 
In this case, however, Sergeant Mangelson did not have the confidence of his 
convictions, as evidenced by his decision not to attempt to seize the contraband roadside. 
Furthermore, Sergeant Mangelson, after kicking, prodding, echo-testing, and moving the tires, 
still did not know what to make of the situation of the shrink-wrapped tires. This is shown on 
the video tape by two incidents surrounding the stop: after thoroughly investigating the tires, 
Sergeant Mangelson (1) reopened the van door for another look, and then (2) asked defendant 
whether there were drugs in the van. When defendant said no and asked Sergeant Mangelson 
whether they looked like drug carriers, Sergeant Mangelson said " I don't know." See R.204, 
Video at 3991. Clearly, in this case, there was neither reasonable suspicion nor probable cause. 
This Court may fairly ask whether a magistrate judge presented with the only relevant evidence 
in this case - no license and shrink-wrapped tires - would find probable cause to issue a 
warrant. 
2. Exploitation of the Illegal Stop and Involuntary Consent 
Even assuming that Sergeant Mangelson was grounded in reasonable suspicion, " the 
scope of the stop is still limited. The officers must 'diligently [pursue] means of investigation 
that [is] likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it [is] necessary 
to detain the defendant." Bisseggar, 2003 UT App. 256, at |19. Certainly the "means of 
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investigation" cannot include improper coercion on the part of the police to obtain an 
involuntary consent to expand the length of the stop. "In assessing this question, we look to the 
totality of the circumstances to ascertain whether consent in fact was voluntarily given and not 
the result of duress or coercion express or implied. We further look to see if there is clear and 
positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and freely given." State v. Castner, 825 
P.2d 699, 704 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Contrary to the district court's findings, it is clear that any consent given Sergeant 
Mangelson by defendant was coerced and/or involuntary. Defendant, as Sergeant Mangelson 
conceded, was not free to go, and was not /allowed to later withdraw his consent, particularly 
given that their identification remained with the officer. This is further evidenced by Sergeant 
Mangelson's command to "leave the door open," thus enabling him to then perform the echo 
test. [See R.204, Video at 3915]. Accordingly, any evidence obtained by the improper 
detention of the defendant should have been suppressed by the district court. In other words, 
Sergeant Mangelson should have issued the driver a citation or warning and let him proceed on 
his way. He did not, and their extended detention was therefore unlawful, and their consent 
involuntarily given. Clearly, the State failed to meet burden of proving otherwise. Castner, 825 
P.2d at 704; Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f 19. 
Moreover, that defendant "consented" to a warrantless search is the beginning, not the 
end, of the inquiry regarding whether a consent to search was validly obtained. See Bello, 871 
P.2d at 854 (determining the validity of consent search involves two-step, whether consent was 
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voluntary and, if so, whether it was obtained through exploitation of prior police misconduct); 
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990) (same); see also New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 
1419, 110 S.Ct. 1640 (1990); Hansen, 2002 UT 125, f H . Here, the district court failed to 
consider the second inquiry, namely, whether defendant's consent was obtained through 
exploitation of Sergeant Mangelson's prior misconduct. See R.69-73; but see Hansen, 2002 UT 
125, [^ 41 (voluntariness of consent and exploitation of detention are legal questions separate 
and apart from the factual inquiry of whether consent was in fact given); Bello, 871 P.2d at 584 
(same). 
Rather, having found probable cause to search, see R.69-73, the district court neglected 
to consider whether defendant's consent was voluntarily-obtained, that is, free from exploitation 
of prior police misconduct. But this Court's decision in Bello and its progeny teaches 
otherwise: the police may not obtain consent to search by illegal detention of a motorist, 
especially when the driver's identity cards have not been returned. See id., 871 P.2d at 854; 
State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also Hansen, 2002 UT 125.5 
C. The District Court erred in finding that the scope of the consent to "look at the 
tires" in the van was not impermissibly extended when Sergeant Mangelson broke the 
plane of the van and began rummaging through the tires; the district court similarly erred 
by not exploring whether defendant's consent was obtained through exploitation of prior 
police misconduct. 
5
 In determining whether the police exploited prior illegality, a reviewing court looks 
at three factors, namely, the flagrancy of the stop, the amount of time that elpased between 
the stop and the consent obtained, and the presence of intervening circumstances. See Bello, 
871 P.2d at 584. As in Bello, the stop here was flagrant as Sergeant gave contradictory 
reasons for the stop, the consent was obtained within minutes of the stop, and there were no 
significant intervening circumstances. 
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A warrantless vehicle search is appropriate if the suspect consents freely and voluntarily. 
See Scneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219, 93 S.Ct. at 2041; Stephens, 946 P.2d at 734. However, a 
suspect may limit the scope of his or her consent. Castner, 825 P.2d at 705. The standard for 
measuring the scope of a suspect's consent under the Fourth Amendment is that of 'objective' 
reasonableness - what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the exchange 
between the officer and the suspect." Castner, 825 P.2d at 705 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 
U.S. 248, 249, 111 S. Ct. 1801 (1991)). 
In the instant case, Sergeant Mangelson asked "what's this back here....How 'bout 
lookin' at it? Do you mind if I look at it?" [R.204, Video at 3857, R.200, at Tr. 12, L. 5]. 
Relying on Sergeant Mangelson's command to "look" at the tires, defendant's response was to 
open the van door. As the video shows, Sergeant Mangelson did not just look at the tires, as 
"looking" is done with the eyes. Rather, Sergeant Mangelson broke the plane of the van's door, 
and thereafter touched, kicked, prodded, moved and otherwise probed the tires. Thus, he far 
exceeded the scope of his own request. The video is clear that Sergeant Mangelson did not ask 
whether he could touch, kick, prod, move and otherwise probe the tires. 
Therefore, the district court erred in finding that defendant consented to the search 
simply by allowing Sergeant Mangelson to look at the tires. The district court further erred in 
finding that, even without defendant's consent, Sergeant Mangelson could have searched the 
vehicle based on probable cause. See R.69-73. "Probable cause" is defined for fourth 
amendment purposes as fair probability that contraband or evidence of crime will be found. 
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State v. Alvarez, 2005 UT App. 145, YH8-12, 111 P.3d 808, 814. This Court has held, for 
example, that strong odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle raises the specter of probable 
cause for a warrantless search. See State v. Wright, 977 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah Ct. App. 1999); 
State v. Yoder, 935 P.2d 534, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
However, in the instant case, Sergeant Mangelson did not testify that he smelled an odor 
of marijuana from the vehicle, nor did the district court so find. Therefore, the fact that 
Sergeant Mangelson observed a shrinkwrap around a tire did not give rise to probable cause to 
search. Thus, this case is distinguishable from cases where strong odor of marijuana provided 
the officer probable cause to search. See id. Moreover, any probable cause garnered by 
Sergeant Mangelson was a result of the illegal seizure and detention of defendant; thus, this 
Court should not allow the State to benefit from Sergeant Mangelson's exploitation of his own 
illegality. See Bello, supra. 
D. The District Court erred in finding that the second roadside search was not 
unconstitutional, given that any apparent consent to search was obviously revoked when 
defendant closed the van's door signifying his intent that he no longer desire to have 
Sergeant mangelson look in the van, or when Sergeant Mangelson impermissibly exploited 
the stop, and/or refused to obtain a warrant notwithstanding absence of any exigent 
circumstance. 
A suspect may limit the scope of his consent. Castner, 825 P.2d at 705. Thus, even if 
defendant consented to the first search, he revoked it when he closed the van's back door. 
Defendant subsequently opened door only after trooper Mangelson commanded that he do so. 
[R.204, Video at 3915]. After Sergeant Mangelson had looked at the tires and then returned to 
his cruiser, Defendant closed the back doors, to which trooper Mangelson ordered him to "leave 
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the door open." R.204, Video at 3895. When he returned to the van from his cruiser, Sergeant 
Mangelson ordered defendant to "stand over here," pointing to the shoulder of the road. R.204, 
Video at 3925. There can be no question consent to search was revoked when defendant closed 
the door to the van, expressing that he no longer wished for Sergeant Mangelson to look in the 
van. 
In United States v. Ibarra, 731 F. Supp. 1039, 1039-40 (D. Wyoming 1990), for example, 
the federal district court held the act of closing and locking the trunk effectively revoked the 
defendant's consent to any future searches: "The court finds that the act of locking the trunk 
effectively revoked the defendant's consent to any future searches of his vehicle." Id. (brackets 
and quotation marks omitted). The court in Ibarra further stated that "[t]his rule is in harmony 
with the general principle that except in unusal circumstances, it would seem that a consent to 
search may be said to be conducted forthwith and that only a single search will be made." 
7tf.,(Citing 3 La Fave, Search and Seizure § 8.1 (c), at 170 (2 ed. 1987)). 
A suspect may also communicate the limitation of a search by his actions. See, e.g., State 
v. Robinson, 659 N.E. 2d 1292 (Ohio App. 1995) (Where a suspect voluntarily opens his door to 
the police but then closes the door, barring the officers' progress into his apartment, he has 
communicated the withdrawal of his consent to the initial intrusion). As in Ibarra, the district 
court here seems to have relied on a 'continuing consent' theory. See R. 60-66. On appeal, 
affirming Ibarra on other grounds, the Tenth Circuit stated the government's theory of 
continuing consent has numerous failings, one of which was the defendant's act of revocation of 
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consent by closing and locking the trunk: "[The] theory of continuing consent is not without 
additional potential failings. For instance, defendant may have revoked his consent when 
he closed and locked the trunk of his vehicle following the first search...." United States v. 
Ibarra, 955 F2d at 1405, 1411 (10th Cir 1992); see also, Cooper v. State, 480 So.2d 8, 11 
(Ala.Ct.Crim. App. 1985) (the act of locking a trunk effectively revokes defendants's consent to 
any future searches of defendant's airplane). 
Therefore, the district court erred in finding and concluding that defendant's consent 
authorized Sergeant Mangelson to continue the second roadside search. 
E. The District Court erred in failing to analyze whether exigent circumstances 
justified the warrantless search of the van, where Sergeant Mangelson had numerous 
opportunities to obtain a warrant, but blatantly refused to so because he believed that he 
had probable cause to conduct a warrantless search. 
It is undisputed in this case that no warrant was sought to search defendants's vehicle and 
its contents. See R.201, at 44-45. Neither is it disputable that: 
"Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable unless undertaken pursuant to a 
recognized exception to the warrant requirement. "State v. Wells, 928 P.2d 386, 
389 (Utah. Ct.App. 1996) (quoting State v. Brown, 85 P.2d 85,855 (Utah 1992). 
Additionally, "[t]he State must demonstrate 'that the circumstances of the seizure 
constitute and exception to the warrant requirement.' Id. (quoting Strickling, 844 
P.2d at 985). 
State v. Montoya, 937 P.2d 145,149 (Utah Ct. App. 1997); see also Brake, 2004 UT 95, \ 9, 103 
P.3d at 699 (under Utah law, warrantless vehicle search must be grounded in both probable 
cause and exigent circumstances); see also Brigham City v. Stuart, 2005 UT , P.3d , 
2005 WL 38796 (Utah, July 18, 2005). As such, the warrantless search here was per se 
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unreasonable, unless the State proves an exception to the warrant requirement exists. Neither the 
State nor the district court attempted to meet this challenge, see R.69-73, and both in fact gloss 
over the issue. 
In response to defendant's trial counsel's question as to why a search warrant was not 
obtained, Sergeant Mangelson replied: " I felt we was at probable cause [sic] and we didn't need 
one." R.201, at Tr. 40, L. 2. Mr. Jardine then asked if that was "the only reason you didn't get a 
warrant?" Id., at Tr. 40, L 4, to which Sergeant Mangelson replied: " [t]hat's - yeah, that's 
basically it." Id, at Tr. 40, L. 6. 
However, it is axiomatic that "[p]robable cause alone is never enough to search.... and 
seize . . . without a warrant. If it were, the protection of the Fourth Amendment would be 
rendered a nullity and probable cause alone would make all warrantless searches per se 
reasonable." State v. Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, f24, 51 P.3d 55. The only possible exception 
to the warrant requirement in the case at bar would be exigent circumstances. It is the State's 
burden, however, to prove exigent circumstances existed. Montoya, 937 P.2d at 149. Given 
Sergeant Mangelson's admission that the only reason he did not get a warrant was because he 
had probable cause, it would apear that any exigent circumstances argument is clearly 
foreclosed. This is compounded by the fact that the both defendant and the driver were arrested 
and in custody in a jail away from the van prior to "breaking-down" the tires and finding the 
contraband. "Under Utah law 'exigent circumstances exists when the car is movable, the 
occupants are alerted [ to the presence of law enforcement], and the car's contents may never be 
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found again if a warrant must be obtained . . . [or] when the safety of police officers is 
threatened." SLW/Utah, State v. Parra, 972 P. 2d 924 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); accord Brake, 2004 
UT 95, | 9 . 
In this case, the first element is not met, as the car was not movable and the driver and the 
passengers were both arrested. Accordingly, exigent circumstances did not exist, and the State 
did not meet this burden, nor did the district court address the issue. However, because the 
record is adequate for this Court to conduct a thorough review of the relevant issues, this Court 
should reverse the district court rather than remand for additional findings on whether exigent 
circumstances precluded Sergeant mangelson from obtaining a warrant. 
CONCLUSIONS AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the reasons specified above, this Court should reverse the decision of the district court 
denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from him and/or remand the matter for 
proceedings consistent with the Court's opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 1st day of December, 2005. 
ISHOLA LAW FIRM, P.C. 
Attorneysfor Defendant-Appellant 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
- 2 8 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief was 
mailed by first-class postage prepaid this 1st day of December, 2005, to: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General for the State of Utah 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
r^JJ? 
- 2 9 -
A D D E N D A 
- 3 0 -
Addendum A 
ofttieMounty, State'bf Utah 
^ ' i b - P - U ^ ^ , . _Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LUIS PEREZ-LLAMAS, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 031600159 
Date: May 5, 2004 
Judge Steven L. Hansen 
Before the Court is the Defendant's Motion to Suppress. The Court, having reviewed and 
considered all relevant memoranda, now makes the following ruling: 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On October 14, 2003, Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway patrol stopped a van for 
an alleged left lane violation. Sergeant Mangelson testified at the preliminary hearing that 
he observed three cars pass the van on the right. Tr. P. 8, L. 6. 
2. Sergeant Mangelson initiated pursuit and signaled the van to pull over. Upon stopping, 
Mangelson approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Sergeant Mangelson testified, 
"As I got to the side of the vehicle I noted a couple of tires that were lying in the back of 
the van." Suppression Hearing (hereinafter "SH"), p. 13. Sergeant Mangelson also 
noticed that the tires were too big for the van and obviously did not belong to the van. 
SH, p. 19-20. Additionally, the officer testified that the tires were wrapped in shrinkwrap. 
SH, p. 14. 
3. Sergeant Mangelson asked for a driver's license and registration. The driver produced a 
high school identification and said that he only had a permit to drive, not a license. The 
passenger, Luis Perez-Llamas was riding in the passenger seat. 
4. After examining the driver's I.D., but before returning it, Mangelson began questioning 
-1 -
[Cifi 
the occupants of the van regarding some packaging that he saw in the back of the van. 
Defendant speaks very little English, and most of the responses were either by the driver, 
or through him acting as an interpreter. The driver responded that there were some tires 
in the back of the van. Mangelson asked if he could look at the tires. In response to his 
request Defendant got out of the car and opened the back door of the van. 
5. Mangelson proceeded to examine the tires and continued his questioning of the occupants. 
After Mangelson looked at the tires, he returned to his cruiser. Defendant then closed the 
back doors of the van. Mangelson then told the Defendant to keep the doors open. 
Defendant then opened the doors. Mangelson returned with a stethoscope. He ordered 
Defendant and the driver to the shoulder of the road while he performed an echo test of 
the tire. 
6. After that, Mangelson ordered the driver to get into his cruiser and told Defendant to get 
in the van and follow him to the police station. About 15 minutes later they arrived at the 
station. Other officers were called on the scene and began searching the van. There was 
some discussion regarding the tires. The air pressure of the tires was taken. Eventually it 
was decided to arrest the driver and defendant. After they were arrested, Mangelson took 
the tires down to a local tire shop to have them "broken down." Upon removing the tires 
from the rims, contraband was uncovered. No warrant was sought to search the van or 
the tires. 
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
I. The Search of the Vehicle Following the Initial Stop did not Violate the 
Fourth Amendment of the Constitution. 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the 
Utah Constitution guarantee the "right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures." It is important to note, "what the 
Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures but unreasonable searches and seizures." 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (internal citation omitted). 
1. The stop was justified because a violation of Utah law occurred in Sergeant 
Mangelson's presence. 
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In evaluating whether or not a search and seizure performed at a traffic stop is 
constitutionally reasonable the Court must conduct a two step inquiry. First, was the police 
officer's action justified at its inception, and second, was the resulting detention reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 
1131-32 (Utah 1994). 
Under Utah statutory and case law, ua police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping 
a vehicle if the stop is, 'incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence.'" Id. 
(quoting State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). "As long as an officer 
suspects that the 'driver is violating any one of the multitude of applicable traffic and equipment 
regulations,' the police officer may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App. 6 
(quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 661, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1400.)) 
In this case, Sergeant Mangelson testified that he observed a vehicle driving in the left lane 
on 1-15 and the vehicle failed to move to the right when three other cars came up from behind. 
Sergeant Mangelson further testified that he observed three other cars move to the right lane and 
pass the minivan. PH p. 8. 1. 2-8. Failing to move from the left lane when another car comes up 
from behind at a faster rate of speed is a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-55. Mr. Zepeda, however, 
testified that cars did not pass him that day, but that he was doing the passing. SH p. 54. 1. 25. 
This Court finds that although there is a dispute in the facts, that Sergeant Mangleson's testimony 
indicates he had a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation was taking place. Since Sergeant 
Mangelson observed this violation of Utah state law, he was justified to stop the vehicle and 
detain the driver long enough to investigate the suspected violation. The Court finds the first 
prong of the inquiry is satisfied; this traffic stop was justified at its inception. 
The Utah Supreme Court recently stated, "once the purpose of the initial stop is 
concluded . . . the person must be allowed to depart. 'Any further temporary detention for 
investigative questioning after [fiifilling] the purpose for the initial stop' constitutes an illegal 
seizure, unless the officer has probable cause or a reasonable suspicion of a further illegality." 
State v. Hansen, 2002 UT 125 f 31 (citations omitted). 
In this case, after Sergeant Mangelson stopped the minivan and as he walked beside the 
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van to talk with the occupants he noticed two large implement tires that obviously did not belong 
to the van that were lying in the back of the van. Sergeant Mangelson noticed that these tires 
were wrapped in shrinkwrap which in his words, "stood out like a neon light to me." (SH p. 49. 
Shortly after noticing the suspicious tires and about the time he initiated conversation with the 
driver of the vehicle, Sergeant Mangelson also noticed a roll of shrinkwrap, which led him to 
believe the occupants of the van had wrapped the tires themselves in order to conceal the odor of 
illegal narcotics and also a piece of cardboard with dried spray foam on it in a circular pattern 
matching the circumference of the tire rims. Sergeant Mangelson has seen on many occasions 
drugs concealed inside of tires, in fact he testified that it is one of the more common methods for 
concealing illegal narcotics. Sergeant Mangelson also testified that every time he has seen dried 
spray foam in a vehicle he has also found illegal narcotics concealed with spray foam. Based on 
Sergeant Mangelson's 37 years of experience in drug interdiction and the observations he made in 
this case he was highly suspicious that the occupants of the van were trafficking illegal narcotics. 
The observations that Sergeant Mangelson initially made meet the level of reasonable 
articulable suspicion and constitute probable cause of criminal activity. However, Sergeant 
Mangelson sought to confirm or dispel his suspicion by asking where the occupants were going 
and what the tires were for. The driver, Reuben Zepeda responded by saying that they were 
headed to West Valley for work and he also provided Sergeant Mangelson a high school ID. card 
from Desert Pines High School in Las Vegas as identification for himself. Sergeant Mangelson 
thought that the story of a 17 year old going to West Valley for work was suspicious because the 
young man should have been in school. Sergeant Mangelson noticed the lack of luggage which he 
thought was strange for people on a long trip away from home to look for work. Additionally, 
the inability of the occupants to explain what the tires were for was very suspicious. Sergeant 
Mangelson also considered that the minivan was traveling a known drug corridor and that it was 
coming from a city, that in his experience, is a source city for illegal narcotics. See State v. Poole, 
871 P.2d 531, 534 (Utah 1994) (case involving Serageant Mangelson stating that 1-15 is a known 
trafficking route). 
All of these factors combined to establish Sergeant Mangelson's extremely strong 
suspicion and established a high probability that illegal drugs were hidden inside of the tires. In 
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fact, Sergeant Mangelson testified that as soon as he saw the tires and how they were wrapped 
up, he knew there was something inside of them. SH, p. 39. 
At this point, based on the probable cause that Sergeant Mangelson developed, the scope 
of the stop expanded from a simple traffic stop to a situation involving narcotics trafficking. In 
order to confirm or dismiss his suspicion Sergeant Mangelson asked the occupants if they would 
allow him to have a closer look at the tires. The occupants agreed and exited the vehicle, went to 
the back and Mr. Perez Llamas opened the back doors up for Sergeant Mangelson. 
In this case both prongs of the required inquiry have been satisfied, the stop was justified 
at its inception and the detention was reasonably related to the purpose of the stop and the 
articulable suspicion and probable cause developed by Sergeant Mangelson while he was 
obtaining information related to the initial reason for the stop. The Court finds that the stop and 
the eventual search of the minivan in this case were reasonable according to both the United 
States and Utah Constitutional requirements. 
2. Sergeant Mangelson obtained consent to look at the tires. 
Even though Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to search the tires and could have 
inspected them even over the objection of the occupants, he sought to obtain the additional 
justification by asking consent to allow him to look closer at the tires. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Hansen has clarified the examination that should take place in 
order to determine whether consent to search was valid. 2002 UT 125, 1} 47. "A consent is valid 
only if '(1) the consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police 
exploitation of the prior illegality."' Id. (citation omitted). 
a. The consent to search was voluntary. 
The Court must first determine, based on the totality of the circumstances, whether the 
defendant consented to the search before it can address whether the consent was voluntary. Id. at 
1|48. 
A review of the video tape of the traffic stop reveals that shortly after Sergeant Mangelson 
asked for permission to look at the tires, Mr. Perez Llamas got out of the van, walked to the back 
and opened the doors for him. Mr. Perez Llamas also agreed at the suppression hearing that he 
gave Sergeant Mangelson permission to look at the tires. SH p. 65, 67. 
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Once a factual determination has been made that consent was given, the analysis focuses 
on whether the consent was voluntary. The Utah Supreme Court clarified the analysis of 
voluntariness by stating: 
The appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances 
test, and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence. Under the totality of 
the circumstances test, a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, 
and the characteristics of the defendant. The totality of the circumstances must show 
consent was given without duress or coercion. In other words, a person's will cannot be 
overborne, nor may "his capacity for self-determination [be] critically impaired." 
Id. at lj 57 (citations omitted). The court then went on to list several factors that may show the 
lack of duress or coercion. These factors are: (1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by 
the officers; (2) the absence of an exhibition offeree by the officers; (3) a mere request to search; 
(4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and (5) the absence of deception or trick on the part 
of the officer. Id. 
In considering these factors, the Court finds the most probative evidence is the video tape 
of the stop. A review of the video tape shows that Sergeant Mangelson made no claim of 
authority to look at the tires and in fact Mr. Perez Llamas agreed that Sergeant Mangelson did not 
make any claim of authority. SH, p. 71. 
The video also shows there was no show offeree. Sergeant Mangelson was alone at the 
time of the request to search, he did not have his hand on his sidearm, his voice was calm and 
even, in short, nothing in Sergeant Mangelson's demeanor could have been construed as a show 
offeree. Mr. Perez Llamas agreed at the suppression hearing that Sergeant Mangelson was alone 
and that there were no threats or show offeree when he requested permission to look at the tires. 
Mr. Perez Llamas did testify that the only think that even came close to a show offeree was after 
Sergeant Mangelson first looked at the tires, he walked back to his car momentarily and when he 
did that Mr. Perez Llamas began to close the door but Sergeant Mangelson yelled something to 
the effect of "don't close it." SH, p. 68. 
The video reveals that Sergeant Mangelson merely made a request to search. Sergeant 
Mangelson simply asked if he could take a closer look at the tires. The words he chose, the tone 
of voice he used and his body language only suggest that this was a request to search and not a 
demand or an order. 
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The video also shows that Mr Perez Llamas cooperated with Sergeant Mangelson He 
got out of the van, came to the back and opened the doors so Sergeant Mangelson could inspect 
the suspicious tires Mr Perez Llamas agreed that in fact he did give Sergeant Mangelson 
permission to look at the tires and that he opened the doors for him SH, p 61 
Lastly, there is no evidence that Sergeant Mangelson used any deception or trickery in 
order to persuade Mr Perez Llamas to consent to the search 
The totality of the circumstances surrounding Mr Perez Llamas' consent to search do not 
reveal any circumstances that would have overridden his will or interfered with his capacity for 
self-determination The Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr Perez Llama's 
consent to look at the tires was without coercion or duress and was given voluntarily Thus, the 
search of the tires was constitutionally reasonable 
CONCLUSION 
This Court denies the defendant's Motion to Suppress and finds the evidence was 
discovered pursuant to a constitutionally reasonable search The State is to prepare an order 
consistent with this ruling and submit it for the Court's signature 
DATED this O? day of May, 2004 
BY THE COURT 
STEVEN L HANSEN, JUDGE 
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Addendum B 
Jared W. Eldndge 
Juab County Attorney 
160 North Main 
Nephi, Utah 84648 
Telephone: (435) 623-3460 
Fax: (435) 623-8919 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, I FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
Case No. 031600159 
vs. I 
LUIS PEREZ LLAMAS, JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN 
Defendant. I 
The defendant, Luis Perez Llamas, through his attorney, Joseph Jardine and the State of 
Utah though, Jared Eldridge, Juab County Attorney, submitted memorandums and oral argument 
to this Court. After considering the arguments of the attorneys and all relevant memoranda, this 
Court now makes the following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On October 14, 2003 Sergeant Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol observed the van 
the defendant, Luis Perez Llamas, was riding in driving in the left lane of 1-15. Sergeant 
Mangelson also observed three cars pass the van in the right lane of 1-15. Due to the van's 
failure to pull to the right to allow the cars to pass, Sergeant Mangelson stopped the van 
for a left lane violation. 
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2. Upon stopping the van, Sergeant Mangelson approached the passenger side of vehicle. As 
Sergeant Mangelson approached the left side of the van, he observed two tires lying in the 
back of the van. Sergeant Mangelson also noticed that the tires were too big for the van 
and obviously did not belong to the van. Additionally, Sergeant Mangelson noticed that 
the tires were wrapped in shrinkwrap. 
3. When Sergeant Mangelson requested the driver's license and registration, the driver 
produced a high school identification card and said that he only had a permit to drive, not 
a license. 
4. The defendant, Luis Perez Llamas, was riding in the passenger seat. 
5. About the time Sergeant Mangelson initiated conversation with the driver, he noticed a 
roll of shrinkwrap, which led him to believe the occupants of the van had wrapped the 
tires to conceal the odor of illegal narcotics. Additionally, Sergeant Mangelson observed a 
piece of cardboard with dried spray foam on it in a circular pattern that appeared to match 
the circumference of the tires.. 
6. In Sergeant Mangelson's 37 years of experience in drug interdiction he has seen on many 
occasions drugs concealed inside of tires. 
7. Every time Sergeant Mangelson has seen dried spray foam in a vehicle he has also found 
illegal narcotics concealed with spray foam. 
8. The observations Sergeant Mangelson made, caused him to be highly suspicious that the 
occupants of the van were trafficking illegal narcotics. 
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9. After examining the driver's identification, which was from Desert Pines High School in 
Las Vegas, Nevada, Sergeant Mangelson began questioning the occupants of the van 
about the items he had observed in the back of the van. 
10. The driver answered some of Sergeant Mangelson's questions and Mr. Perez Llamas, 
who speaks very little English, responded to some of Sergeant Mangelson's questions 
through the driver, who acted as an interpreter. 
11. Sergeant Mangelson asked the occupants where they were going and what the tires were 
for. The driver of the vehicle responded by saying they were coming from Las Vegas and 
going to West Valley for work. 
12. Sergeant Mangelson thought the story of a 17 year old going to West Valley for work was 
suspicious because he should have been in school. 
13. Sergeant Mangelson also observed the lack of luggage which he thought was strange for 
people who were a long way from home looking for work. 
14. Sergeant Mangelson also considered that 1-15 is a known drug corridor and that Las 
Vegas is a source city for illegal drugs. 
15. Sergeant Mangelson asked if he could look at the tires in the back of the van. Mr. Perez 
Llamas responded to this question by getting out of the van and opening the back doors of 
the van. Mr. Perez Llamas agreed that he gave Sergeant Mangelson permission to look at 
the tires. 
16. Ultimately, Sergeant Mangelson discovered approximately 40 pounds of marijuana 
concealed inside of the tires. 
3 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Sergeant Mangelson had reasonable suspicion to believe a violation of U.C.A. § 41-6-55 
occurred. Therefore, the initial stop of the van was justified at its inception. 
2. While Sergeant Mangelson was obtaining information related to the initial purpose of the 
stop he developed probable cause to believe the occupants of the van were smuggling 
illegal narcotics. 
3. Based on the probable cause that Sergeant Mangelson developed, the scope of the stop 
expanded from a simple traffic stop to a situation involving narcotics trafficking. 
4. Even though Sergeant Mangelson had probable cause to search the tires and could have 
inspected them even over the objection of the occupants, he sought to obtain additional 
justification for a search by asking for consent. 
5. This Court finds that Mr. Perez Llamas consented to allow Sergeant Mangelson to look at 
the tires. 
6. Additionally, after considering the totality of the circumstances, this Court finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Mr. Perez Llamas5 consent for Sergeant Mangelson 
to look at the tires was without coercion or duress and was given voluntarily. 
7. This Court finds that the stop and eventual search of the minivan in this case were 
reasonable according to both the United States and Utah Constitutional requirements. 
8. Furthermore, this Court finds that the search of the tires in this case was constitutionally 
reasonable. 
4 
ORDER 
IT IS NOW THEREFORE ORDERED, that the Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
marijuana discovered inside of the tires in this case is denied. 
DATED this /f day of July, 2004. 
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Addendum C 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 3 - 2 0 0 5 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Luis Perez-Llamas, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER DENYING REMAND 
Case No. 20041084-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Greenwood. 
This appeal is before the court on a motion for remand under 
Rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. A remand is 
available only upon "a nonspeculative allegation of facts, not 
fully appearing in the record on appeal, which, if true, could 
support a determination that counsel was ineffective" including 
facts that show "the claimed deficient performance of the 
attorney" and "the claimed prejudice suffered by the appellant as 
a result of the claimed deficient performance." Utah R. App. P. 
23B(a) & (b). 
Appellant Luis Perez-Llamas entered a conditional guilty 
plea, pursuant to State v. Serv, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988), which preserved the right to appeal from the denial of a 
motion to suppress. He now seeks a remand to consider the claim 
that his trial counselirendered ineffective assistance in 
connection with the entry of his guilty plea by allegedly 
affirmatively misrepresenting the possibility that he would be 
deported as a result of the guilty plea and resulting conviction. 
See State v. Roias-Martinez, 2003 UT 203, 77 P.3d 467, cert. 
granted, 80 P.3d 152 (holding that where counsel affirmatively 
represented the deportation consequences of a guilty plea, the 
plea was not knowing and voluntary). 
Perez-Llamas did not make a timely motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea prior to sentencing, as required by Utah Code section 
77-13-6(2) (b) . See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2) (b) (Supp. 2005) . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on November 3, 2005, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the parties listed below: 
J FREDERIC VOROS JR 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
HAKEEM ISHOLA 
ISHOLA & ASSOCIATES PC 
716 E 4500 S STE N-142 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84107 
Dated this November 3, 2005. 
By 
Deputy Clerk 
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U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. IV 
C 
Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
*H Annotated 
*ii) Amendment IV. Searches and Seizures (Refs & Annos) 
-•Amendment IV. Search and Seizure 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
NOTES OF DECISIONS 
<Notes of Decisions for this amendment are displayed in four separate documents. Notes of Decisions for 
subdivisions I to XI are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XII to 
XXIV, see the second ranked document for Amend. IV-Search and Seizure. For Notes of Decisions for 
subdivisions XXV to XXXIV see the third ranked document for Amend. IV-Search and Seizure. For 
Notes of Decisions for subdivisions XXXV to end, see the fourth ranked document for Amend IV-Search 
and Seizure.> 
I. GENERALLY 1-80 
II. PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH AMENDMENT APPLICABLE 81-120 
III. ACTION RESTRICTED BY AMENDMENT 121-190 
IV. RIGHTS AND INTERESTS PROTECTED GENERALLY 191-220 
V. PRIVACY 221-310 
VI. PROTECTION AND STANDING OF PERSONS 311-420 
VII. PROTECTION OR EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN PLACES AND 
OBJECTS 421-590 
VIII. ABANDONED PROPERTY 591-640 
IX. COMMUNICATIONS, CONVERSATIONS, PAPERS AND 
DOCUMENTS 641-700 
X. WAIVER OF PROTECTION 701-750 
XI. SEIZURE OF PERSONS GENERALLY 751-830 
XII. STOPS AND DETENTIONS 831-980 
XIII. ARREST GENERALLY 981-1110 
XIV. ISSUANCE OF ARREST WARRANTS GENERALLY 1111-1150 
XV. AFFIDAVITS OR COMPLAINTS UNDERLYING ARREST 
WARRANTS 1151-1200 
XVI. PROBABLE CAUSE FOR ISSUANCE OF ARREST 
WARRANTS 1201-1250 
XVII. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY OF ARREST 
WARRANTS 1251-1290 
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USCA CONST Amend. XIV Page 1 
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. XIV 
C 
Effective: [See Text Amendments] 
United States Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of the United States 
"ia Annotated 
"Ssi Amendment XIV. Citizenship; Privileges and Immunities; Due Process; Equal Protection; 
Apportionment of Representation; Disqualification of Officers; Public Debt; Enforcement 
"•AMENDMENT XIV. CITIZENSHIP; PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES; DUE PROCESS; 
EQUAL PROTECTION; APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATION; DISQUALIFICATION OF 
OFFICERS; PUBLIC DEBT; ENFORCEMENT 
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens 
of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection 
of the laws. 
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, 
counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any 
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any 
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, 
or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an 
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as 
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a 
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for 
payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all 
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
<Section 1 of this amendment is further displayed in separate documents according to subject matter,> 
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UT CONST Art. 1, § 14 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953, Const. Art. 1, § 14 
c 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Constitution of Utah 
*S Article I. Declaration of Rights 
-•Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects 
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant 
shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Administrative subpoenas in controlled substances investigations, see § 77-
22a-l. 
Criminal procedure, searches, seizures, and forfeitures, see § 32A-13-103. 
Crimes involving civil rights, penalties for hate crimes, see § 76-3-203.3. 
Exclusion of evidence seized by unlawful search, see § 77-23-212. 
Pornographic materials, search and seizure, see § 76-10-1212. 
Warrants, search and administrative, see § 77-23-101 et seq. 
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES 
Determining Whether Miranda Warnings are Necessary: Utah's Definition of Custody, 
1997 Utah L. Rev. 137 (1997). 
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Affidavit for Search Warrant, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 325 (1994). 
Fourth Amendment's Application to Government Actors Engaged in Non-Law Enforcement 
Activities, 1999 Utah L. Rev. 1027 (1999). 
Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine and Standard of Review for Voluntariness of 
Consent Following Police Illegality, 1994 Utah L. Rev. 325 (1994). 
Heeding the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, 
Article I, Section 14, Wallentine, 17 J. Contemp. L. 267 (1991). 
How the Utah Supreme Court Gave Thieves an Interest in Their Victim's Property: 
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E> 
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness 
Title 58. Occupations and Professions 
*B Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos) 
-•§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; 
or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in 
any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d 
that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations 
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that are 
undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the 
person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of 
management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, 
or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in Schedule III is guilty of a second 
degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a 
second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree felony. 
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(c) An^ person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsectioi l (1) (a) (ii) ox 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 7 6- 10-501 
was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession 
during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term, not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1) (a) (iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties: 
{a) 11 I s unlawful: 
(I) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(i i) f or any owner, t enant, licensee, o r pe r s on i n control of an^ bu i1d ing, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be" occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, 
using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an a 1 tered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) A n y p e r s o n c o n v :i c t e d o f v :i o 1 a 1: :i i I g S i ib s e c t i o i i (2) (a) (:i ) \ >/ :i 1 1 I r e s p e c t t o: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(111) ma r i j uan a, if the ma r i j u a na i s no t I n t he f o rm of an extracted resin f r om 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person fs conviction of a violation of tl lis Subsection (2) subsequent 
to a conviction under Subsection (1) (a), that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any persoi I who violates Subsection (2) (a) (i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2 ) {b) (I) , (i i ) , • :>r (i i i ) , 
© 2005 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Page 2 
U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (1) (a) (ii) or 
(iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by 
law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 7 6- 10-501 
was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession 
during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court shall 
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (1) (a) (iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a 
valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the 
course of his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, 
using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16 
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent 
to a conviction under Subsection (1) (a), that person shall be sentenced to a one 
degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2) (a) (i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
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including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon 
a thi rd or subsequent conviction the person i s gui ] ty of a thj rd degree felony. 
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined 
in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2) (b) , and 
if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as listed in: 
(i) S ub s e c t i o n (2) (b) , the p e r s o n ma y b e s e n t e n c e d 1: o i mp r i s o rune n 1: f o r a i I 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and: 
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of 
one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and 
(B) the cour t may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term not to exceed five years to i: i n I consecutively and not: 
concurrently; and 
(ii) Subsection (2) (d) , the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an 
indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall additionally 
sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and 
not concurrently. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(i I ) o n a second conviction, gu i ] t y o f a c J a s s A ini s derne a n o r; a i id 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, gui11y of a third degree felony. 
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4) (c) who, in an 
offense not amounting to a violation of Section 76-5-207: 
(i) violates Subsection (2) (a) (i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his 
body any measurable amount of a controlled substance; and 
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 7 6-5-20 7 in a negligent 
manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in Section 7 6-1-601 or the 
death of another. 
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intenti ona ] 3 y: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or issued 
to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to 
assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, 
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apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to 
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or 
failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance from 
another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or 
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of 
the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a 
counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3) (a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to 
the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact 
finds the act is committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of 
any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity sponsored 
by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10- 501 
; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
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house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
( „ :i :i :i ) :i n a pubI i c parking 1 ot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any s t rue t ur e, fac :i ] i t \/ : :i ; g :i : : i n I I s :i nclude :l :i • I 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); 
(x) in the immediate presence oi a P*MN<'" '/<»UJI'U'| tih I;1: yi'.-n nf .jgf, 
regardless of where the act occurs; or 
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, 
delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of this section to an 
inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Secti on 
76-8-311.3. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would 
have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not 
be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
lc) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under Subsection (2) (g) or this Subsection (4) ,i s gi li Ity of one degree 
more than the maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
I, i II ' h> " i. .l,,t i..n :i s of Su b s e c t i - n M ) iu! ( x i ) : 
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, and the court shall additionally sentence the person 
convicted for a term, of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; 
and 
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an 
indeterminate term,,, not to exceed, five years to n in consecutively and not 
concurrently; and 
(:i ;i ) t he pena 1 ties unde r this S ub sect ion, (4 ) {d} app ly also to any pers on who, 
acting with the mental state reguired for the commission of an offense, 
directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or 
intentionally aids another person to commit a violation of Subsection 
(4) (a) {xi,,,} . 
(e) It: is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of 
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described 
in Subsection (4) (a) or was unaware that the location where the act occurred was 
as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) t i I ;y v :i o J a 1: ,i o i i o f 1.1 :i i s :: h a p 1: e r f c ,r \ /h :i c h i I c p e i I a ,1 t:„. y ,:i s s p e c „i f ,;i e d is a class B 
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misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and 
not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for 
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course 
of his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, 
dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances 
to be administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, 
distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for use as a placebo 
or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course 
of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
Laws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 
1979, c. 12, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 
92, § 100; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 
2; Laws 1989, c. 56, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 178, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 
1989, c. 201, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 161, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 163, §§ 2, 3; Laws 
1991, c. 80, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 4; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 7; Laws 1995, c. 
284, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 1, § 8, eff. Jan. 31, 1996; Laws 1997, 
c. 64, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws 
1999, c. 12, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; 
Laws 2003, c. 10, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2003, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 5, 2003; 
Laws 2004, c. 36, § 1, eff. March 15, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 30, § 1, eff. May 2, 
2005. 
CROSS REFERENCES 
Arrest of school employee, notice required, see § 53-10-211. 
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